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Introduction
1 The construction of new railway infrastructure tends to go hand-in-hand with significant
urban (re)development projects at a local scale (Bruinsma & al., 2008; Van den Berg and
Pol, 1998; Roth and Polino, 2003). The reorganisation of the railway system following the
arrival of high-speed rail (HSR) offers opportunities to improve the integration of railway
spaces  within  the  existing  urban  environment  and  to  palliate  the  barrier  effects
associated  with  the  earlier  introduction  of  many  traditional  railway  installations  by
urban growth (Bellet and Gutiérrez,  2011; Santos,  2007).  However, in many cases,  the
arrival of the high-speed train (HST) has also been used as an excuse to embark upon
important development projects around stations which,  in some cases,  have involved
former railway land (Bertolini and Spit, 1998).
2 In Spain, several city councils have taken advantage of the arrival of HSR to rethink the
whole local railway system. These rail transformations have caused major changes to the
physical urban environment and have also been accompanied by property development
projects that were initially planned during a period of economic expansion associated
with a boom in the property cycle (2003-2008). Those have fuelled both rail infrastructure
and urban development projects (Gaja, 2008; Rullán, 2011). In some Spanish cities, the
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introduction  of  HSR  has  also  been  accompanied  by  specific  issues  relating  to  the
conception and the management of these projects and associated governance issues :
• The new railway infrastructure goes beyond the simple introduction of new rail projects. In
fact  project  has focus on maximalist  infrastructural  interventions whose main aim is  to
eliminate the barrier effect associated with the traditional railway system. In the majority of
cases, the introduction of HSR also implies a complete remodelling of the existing railway
system,  which  constitutes  an  original  solution  within  the  wider  European  context.
Furthermore, from the technical point of view, it offers a powerful argument for designing a
large and ambitious project associated with urban renewal and development. 
• The  larger  rail  and  associated  urban  development/renewal  projects  have  mainly  been
managed by the public sector and involved all the levels of public administration plus the
Spanish rail administrator (ADIF) and Spain’s national rail operator (RENFE). The option that
was chosen over other alternatives based on public law (including special offices, consortia,
agencies, private foundations based on public initiatives) moved this public service into the
domain of private law (Santos, 2013).
• A third specific characteristic of Spanish cases lies in the way that all of these rail and urban
interventions were supposed to be financed. They were all designed to be “self-financed”
projects,  in  which  the  profits  from  associated  urban  development  and  redevelopment
(including  real-estate  income)  projects  would  cover  all  of  the costs  of  these  ambitious
railway and urban interventions.
3 The combination of  these  factors  has  resulted in some of  the most  ambitious  urban
renewal and redevelopment projects ever planned in Spanish cities (Bellet and Gutiérrez,
2011). This is particularly evident in the cases of two large intermediate cities: Zaragoza,
on the Madrid-Barcelona-French border HSR line, where the new train service arrived in
October 2003; and Valladolid, on the northwest HSR line, which received the HSR service
in December 2007. Both cities are medium-sized agglomerations of the Iberian Peninsula
and  interior  capitals  of  their  respective  region,  situated  between  Madrid  and  the
northern zone of the country.
4 In both cases, the project for the implementation of the new railway infrastructure led to
a major transformation of the railway system within the city. This has also been used as
an argument in favour of carrying out large, ambitious, urban development projects. In
this paper,  we have undertaken a comparative analysis  of  the two cases highlighted,
focusing on: railway and urban transformations associated with the arrival of HSR; the
coherence  of  these  transformations  with  respect  to  existing  territorial  and  strategic
planning; the management of rail and urban projects; and the current level of execution
of the plans originally presented. 
5 The case analysis has been developed on the basis of several different hypotheses: 
• From an operational viewpoint, the fact that this kind of limited company corporation has
managed these macro-scale  urban development projects  has,  at  the same time,  been an
innovative experience in urban management and a source of problems in Spain; 
• Self-financing is a poor principle and one that undermines urban planning; 
• The definition of new areas of centrality and urban development projects are not strategic
aspects in themselves, but rather a consequence of the maximalist railway interventions to
solve the problem of barrier effects.
6 The two case  studies  chosen describe  the  current  state  of  these  projects  within  the
present context of a serious financial and economic crisis, identifying a series of issues
that could equally apply to other examples in Spain. Our main sources have been: an
The high-speed rail project as an urban redevelopment tool
Belgeo, 3 | 2016
2
analysis of urban planning documentation (Master Plans and specific development plans
for  areas  around railway stations);  a  historical  analysis  of  local  press  articles;  and a
number of in-depth interviews with local government staff and people responsible from
urban planning in the corresponding local administrations.
 
The arrival of HSR as a key component of urban
projects 
7 The  introduction  of  new  infrastructure  inevitably  has  a  spatial  impact  on  the  local
territory. This is even more pronounced when it involves the incorporation of a piece of
transport  infrastructure  because,  in  addition  to  the  changes  generated  by  its  very
construction,  this  also implies substantial  modifications to spatial  accessibility.  These
transformations are all the more important when the transport infrastructure in question
needs to be integrated into a more or less consolidated urban environment. As a result,
studies of the introduction of HSR services in cities tend to focus on a very specific scale:
the station and the neighbourhood in which it is located, whether these are of relatively
new creation or have been generated by urban renewal (Bruinsma & al., 2008, Van den
Berg & Pol, 1998).
8 In some cases, urban planners can take advantage of this remodelling to move railway
installations that had previously been trapped within the urban fabric (such as technical
and freight facilities and railway repair workshops) out to the edge of the city.  Such
actions free centrally located land which can then be used for urban re-development
projects associated with the new-found centrality (Bruinsma & al., 2008; Santos, 2011).
Urban projects associated with HSR stations in Europe could also be analysed using the
same logic that has been applied to other iconic interventions associated with neoliberal
urbanism (Thornley & Newman, 2011). In this context, railway stations have emerged as
key sites for property-led capital  accumulation and as engines for local  development
strategies (Peters & Novy, 2012). However, for many European cities, the arrival of HSR
has formed part  of  an urban development project that has not only been capable of
transforming the areas around stations (and the stations themselves) but also of leaving
its mark on the wider structure of the city (Loukaitou-Sideris & al., 2012). In this way, new
HSR services can produce local-scale urban development projects which are capable of
modifying not only station areas but also the physical and functional structure of the
whole urban area (Bellet and Gutiérrez, 2011; Peters, 2009). Indeed, in several Spanish
cities, high-speed rail has been used as an argument in favour of modernity, serving as an
excuse for the construction of new railway systems and new stations. 
9 Although the introduction of HSR infrastructure in Spanish cities has opened the way for
major urban transformations and redevelopment projects, it is still difficult to qualify the
integration of the railway within Spanish cities as satisfactory (Santos, 2007). Urban decay
in station neighbourhoods, tracks and infrastructure trapped within the urban fabric and
that act as barriers, and railway spaces that lack functionality are all frequent features of
Spanish city-centres. Historically speaking, urban planning and railways have been two
very  separate  and  unrelated  phenomena.  This  perhaps  explains  why  railways  have
traditionally been regarded as a nuisance in urban areas and why, in Spain, projects that
introduce and/or integrate new HSR infrastructure and services have tended to propose
radical or “hard” solutions. These solutions, which have generally implied covering or
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burying centrally located stretches of track, or building new external lines, have tended
to treat the railway as an urban problem whose effects need to be palliated. As we shall
see, these “hard” solutions, which tend to be complex and to require important levels of
investment, are both intense and far-reaching. Choices were originally influenced by the
anticipated property gains  from the sale  of  former railway land and the subsequent
displacement  of  old  railway installations  to  new peripheral  locations.  Although such
profits  were  initially  expected to  cover  most  of  the  costs  associated  with  the  wider
projects, the current economic crisis, which has proved particularly long and difficult,
has posed serious doubts about the future of  many of  these urban development and
railway projects.  As  a  result,  many projects,  including those  of  Valladolid,  Zaragoza,
Madrid and Barcelona, have been almost completely paralysed (Bellet & al., 2012).
 
Railway and urban transformation associated with the
arrival of the HSR in Valladolid and Zaragoza
10 In Zaragoza and Valladolid, the restructuring of the railway system was seen as a major
instrument  of  urban planning.  Both are  important  urban areas  within Spain’s  urban
system and have large areas of influence over their surrounding territories. Zaragoza,
with a population of 664,953 (2015), is Spain’s fifth largest city by population and is the
capital of the autonomous region of Aragon in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula. It is
about 310 km from Madrid and occupies a strategic position in the Ebro Valley corridor,
which connects the centre of the peninsula to Barcelona and the French border. It is an
important  logistical  and industrial  node,  which has  notably  specialised in the  motor
industry and in auxiliary appliances, paper and agribusiness.
11 Valladolid, which had 303,905 inhabitants in 2015, is the most important urban area in
the northwest of the peninsula and is approximately 210 km from Madrid. Its strategic
position  for  communications,  through  a  wide  network  of  transport  corridors,  and
function as a logistical node within the European Atlantic Corridor, will continue to allow
it to specialise as the main industrial pole in Castilla y Leon.
12 Both rail projects were mainly based on the construction of external railway lines for
passing traffic which were supposed to make it possible to transfer freight and other
more extensive rail installations to the urban periphery. This policy was to keep the main
stations in more or less central locations and also to involve covering extensive sections
of track passing through the central areas of the city. 
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Figure 1. Zaragoza and Valladolid in the Spanish HSR context (May 2015).
Source: the authors’ own work based on ADIF
13 The  displacement  of  major  railway  facilities  to  the  periphery  was  to  allow  the
transformation of  central  urban spaces,  taking advantage of  the  property  gains  that
would be generated from the sale of former railway land. In order to achieve this goal,
specific urban renewal projects were designed for the land that was to be freed in central
locations. 
14 In both cities, the number of resulting residential uses has, however, been far greater
than that of tertiary uses. This sharply contrasts with what occurred in similar urban
projects carried out in other European cities, such as Lille and Lyon, in France (Fraser and
Baert, 2003; Colomb, 2007; Hall, 1995). However, the urban planning strategies used by
these two local  government organisations are what most differentiate these cases.  In
Zaragoza, the combination of several different strategies has taken the form of major,
inter-connected urban projects.  In  contrast,  Valladolid’s  urban development  and rail
project have not been accompanied by any other kind of global urban strategy.
 
The implementation of the HSR project in Zaragoza 
15 In Zaragoza, the arrival of HSR could be understood as the introduction of an instrument
capable of delivering the new urban plans and projects on which the city had already
been  working  since  the  early  1990s.  The  first  version  of  the  Strategic  Plan  for  the
metropolitan area (Ebrópolis) was passed in 1998. The urban Master Plan (Plan General de
Ordenación Urbana) was subsequently passed in 2001. Other urban projects of significant
size and importance included: the Plan to Recover the Banks of the River Ebro; the Expo
2008,  international  exhibition;  and  the  construction  of  one  of  the  largest  logistical
platforms in Europe (Plaza).
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16 After tough negotiations, and much debate in the city concerning the best location for the
new rail services, it was eventually decided to build a new station on the western side of
the city, where there were already several other activities related to the classification of
rail  freight.  However,  the choice of  this  location implied a major remodelling of  the
railway system within the city. These changes to the railway system were expected: to
provide opportunities to improve the general organisation of the city’s physical urban
structure; to help to remove certain barriers associated with the railway; and to foster the
development of a new city model that formed part of the Master Plan (Plan General de
Ordenación) (Alonso and Bellet, 2009; Ureña & al., 2009).
17 A bypass for passing traffic was built to the south of the city. This was accompanied by
the construction of a new freight station, located in an area where there were plans to
build the PLAZA logistics platform. This platform, which was projected as one of the
largest intermodal logistics platforms in southern Europe, with an area of more than 1300
ha, currently accommodates the premises of several important national and international
companies,  including  Inditex,  DHL  Express,  TDN,  BSH,  Barclays  Bank,  Imaginarium,
Decathlon  and  Mann-Hummel  Ibérica.  The  inter-modality  of  this  logistics  platform
(which provides lorry, rail and plane connections) is one of its major strengths. 
 
Figure 2. The new railway system in Zaragoza, following the arrival of HSR.
Source: the authors’ own work based on the railway project
18 The construction of the by-pass pulled the city out towards the south, thereby generating
great  expectations  for  further  urban growth between the urban centre and the new
external (road and rail) rings. Development projects were subsequently passed for several
of the large plots of land created within the same process. These were then prepared for
urbanisation and developed during the boom in the property cycle.  However,  a large
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number of the initially projected developments subsequently failed to emerge as a result
of the property crisis and much of the land in question currently remains undeveloped.
 
Figure 3. The new railway station and the development plan for Delicias.
Source: based on Zaragoza Alta Velocidad, S.A
19 In the city centre, the old central station (El Portillo) was dismantled and the surrounding
area was subjected to a renewal project which sought to develop a new urban centrality
affecting a total surface area of around 9.3 hectares. These operations freed almost 105 ha
of land near the centre of the city. The redevelopment plan for the Portillo area, which
was passed in 2005, initially envisaged the construction of an area of housing and a series
of important cultural amenities that were supposed to reinforce the traditional urban
centrality  of  this  area.  However,  this  project  has  so  far  only  delivered  the  cultural
CaixaForum building (inaugurated in 2014) and a metropolitan railway station. The rest
of the project has yet to be undertaken; the old railway station is still  waiting to be
demolished and a post office building has yet to be moved to a site near the new station. 
20 Meanwhile, in the western part of city, a completely new station (Zaragoza-Delicias) has
been built on land that had previously been occupied by the old freight station. This
operation, which affects 95.8 hectares on the west side of the city, aims to open up this
part of  the city to the river,  to connect the neighbourhoods on the west side of the
metropolitan area (Delicias  and Almozara),  and to  pull  centrality  outwards  from the
existing city centre and towards the location of the new station. 
21 The new intermodal station has been equipped with a hotel and with commercial and
restaurant  services,  but  it  has  so  far  been  unable  to  attract  any  major  uses  to  its
immediate vicinity. This was initially largely due to problems deriving from the economic
crisis, but it has also been a result of an overambitious policy to create areas within the
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city earmarked for tertiary sector activities and which were supposed to share centrality
throughout the urban area. 
22 Urban development around the Delicias station, which included general operations and
work to improve accessibility, progressed at a good rhythm between 2003 and 2008, when
Zaragoza hosted Expo 2008, the international exhibition. However, the land to the west of
the station, where the majority of 3,000 units of social housing were supposed to be built,
has since remained undeveloped. Problems deriving from the management of this land,
combined with the onset of the economic crisis, subsequently led to the paralysis of the
development  projects  that  had  initially  been  reserved  for  this  site.  This  has  left  an
enormous urban void, which is currently surrounded by fences (Bellet and Alonso, 2016).
 
Figure 4. The development plan for the Portillo (old station) area.
Source: based on the scheme project presented by Zaragoza Alta Velocidad, S.A
23 The initial aim of Zaragoza City Council was to establish a technological development
project, called the “Digital Mile”, in the area between Delicias and El Portillo. In this way,
it sought to take the fullest possible advantage of the urban development located between
the two railway areas (107 ha) and to organise a space dedicated to new technologies and
the knowledge and information society.  These  projects  area  mainly  related with the
availability of land available after the urbanisation of former rail installations. As well as
housing units, this project also foresaw the construction of a series of unique buildings
that were meant to stand out on account of their specific functions. These were to be
related  to  multimedia  technologies  and  to  provide  digitalised  public  spaces  and
technological and cultural amenities.
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Figure 5. The current state of work in the Portillo (left) and Delicias (right) areas.
  
Source: photos by the authors
24 To date, however, only two of the amenities associated with these new uses have come
into service: the Digital Mile Nursery for Business Activity (located in the Zero Emissions
Building) and the Etopia Centre for Art & Technology (CAT). 
 
The implementation of the HSR project in Valladolid
25 The HSR line between Madrid and Valladolid finally opened towards the end of 2007. This
followed a protracted period of technical studies that had begun back in 1987, with the
General Plan for Railway Transport (Plan de Transporte Ferroviario), which in turn followed
a series of somewhat contradictory prior studies that were presented over a period of
twelve years. 
26 The new railway infrastructure for Valladolid was ultimately conceived, not as a node and
point of departure and arrival for rail travel, but rather as the main centre for a future
tree-shaped HSR network that would be connected to the northeast and north of Spain.
Its construction and entry into service were first delayed, and then paralysed, over a
period  of  five  years.  Here,  HSR  formed  part  of  a  project  for  the  urban  renewal  of
Valladolid which had been passed by the local government administration back in 2001.
27 This  study  included  informative  studies  for  the  Central  Railway  Corridor  (Pasillo
Ferroviario  Central),  the  Eastern  Variant  and  the  New  Railway  Complex  which  were
approved by Spain’s Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento) in December 2005. It
was followed by the corresponding Public Information period and the drafting of the
construction projects. 
28 In June 2005, the firm High Speed Valladolid (Valladolid Alta Velocidad) awarded the task of
drafting the PGOU of Valladolid and the Special Plan for the reorganization of the Central
Rail Network to a team led by the Richard Rogers Partnership. It was first necessary to
design urban strategies and general  proposals  for the areas freed from railway uses,
within a process that involved the drafting of what was, somewhat inappropriately, called
a Master Plan. This document, which established the overall structure for the area and
laid down the main guidelines for its urban design, has since inspired the reorganization
of the general urban plan for Valladolid with respect to the Central Rail Network.
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Figure 6. The new railway system at Valladolid following the arrival of HSR.
Source: the authors’ own work based on the railway project
29 This modification was initially proposed between March 2008 and July 2009 and finally
approved in 2010. This railway operation initially consisted of burying part of an 18 km-
long Railway Corridor (using a 0.67 km-long tunnel on the urban periphery and a more
central, 4.67 km long, tunnel leading to a new underground station) and building a 10 km-
long stretch of  standard gauge  railway  line  (the  Eastern Variant),  which would  also
receive a New Railway Complex (with a central repair workshop, maintenance workshops,
a marshalling yard and a freight terminal).
30 The eventual relocation of these installations to the by-pass will free an area of almost
100 ha in the city centre and the remaining stretches of track will be covered. This will
allow the development of the largest urban renewal operation in the history of the city, at
a cost that could exceed a billion euros. 
31 Of the discontinuous area of some 995,549 m2 of land that was to be released from railway
uses, the general plan for reorganization allowed 666,990 m2 to be released for residential
uses (this implied enough land for around 6,065 new houses, or to accommodate 20,000
people, in a city of 130,000 inhabitants), 170,200 m2  for offices and hotels, 6,000 m2 for
trade, catering and non-residential uses, and 5,000 m2 for private amenities (a total of
181,200 m2 for tertiary uses, or 21% of the sector’s total development potential) (Santos,
2006).
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Figure 7. The integration of the railway in the centre of Valladolid.
Source: Compiled by the authors based on images of the “Binding Memory on the Master
Plan Modiﬁcation – Plan for Central Railway Network” (July 2009), p. 76
 
Figure 8. The new Valladolid: the Rogers partnership project.
Source: Compiled by authors based on images of the “Binding Memory on the Master Plan
Modiﬁcation – Plan for Central Railway Network” (July 2009), p. 84
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32 The in-depth reorganization of the sector (with a total development capacity of 848,190 m
2) was established through five intervention units (Unidades de Actuación) that divided the
sector into different integrated management areas. According to this plan, half of the new
housing was to be built in the most central area (Santos, 2006).
33 The proposal for an “Equipped Sustainable Corridor”, which was supposed to occupy a
large part of the “Central Railway Corridor” (around 7 ha), subsequently turned out to be
one of the best proposals within this urban intervention. It helped to balance the corridor
concept  by  adding transversality  and providing an urban articulation.  It  did  this  by
providing the Central Railway Corridor with a number of public spaces for the use of
pedestrians and cyclists: a platform reserved for public transport; a space, equivalent to
at least 5% of the total area, dedicated to sports, recreation, leisure, meetings and hotel
uses; a design compatible with road use; and a space equivalent to at least 85% of the total
area dedicated to parks and gardens. 
 
The role of “Zaragoza Alta Velocidad, S.A.” and
“Valladolid Alta Velocidad 2003, S.A.”
34 Large-scale urban interventions of this type have far-reaching implications, which largely
explain why limited companies were created in both cities to manage their actions. These
corporations (which tend to be limited companies subject to public control) were created
in order  to  manage macro-scale  urban development  projects  associated with railway
infrastructure. They were set up with public capital,  following the signing of specific
agreements between the national, regional and local administrations. The funding for
these urban projects was almost exclusively based on the property gains to be produced
by  the  sale  of  former  railway  land  and its  subsequent  urbanisation.  However,  these
property gains and values were calculated when the property market was still growing.
At  the  beginning  of  the  21st century,  the  income  to  be  obtained  from the  sale  and
development of property was expected to cover the cost of these large-scale urban rail
projects. However, contrary to the initial expectation that the economy would continue
to grow, the property bubble soon burst. 
35 These companies, which had been set up with very little initial capital, then had to source
external funding if they were to cover all of the requirements laid out in the development
process: the assignment of construction projects and railway work and urban planning
and the reorganization and development of units of action. The financing and timing of
these actions was an essential  part  of  the project,  but the “self-funding” part  of  the
process proved completely inadequate. A “self-funded” urban-railway action is supposed
to be financed by the profits accruing from the use of former railway land released from
rail-related  functions.  Administrations  therefore  tend  to  rely  on  only  a  minimum
quantity  of  direct  income  and  to  seek  the  majority  of  their  funding  from property
investment; this is a strategy that involves a significant level of risk (Santos, 2013). 
36 Publically funded companies were created in both Zaragoza and Valladolid: Zaragoza Alta
Velocidad 2002, Sociedad Anónima -ZAV- (http://www.zav.es/) and Valladolid Alta Velocidad
2003, Sociedad Anónima ‑VAV- (http://valladolidaltavelocidad.es/) and governed according
to similar rules and regulations. Their resources were provided, in equal parts, by the
state and the corresponding regional and local administrations and also by ADIF (the
Spanish rail administrator) and RENFE (the Spanish rail operator). These companies were
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headed by the Secretary of State for Infrastructure, who then proposed a General Director
to run each company.
 
The role of “Zaragoza Alta Velocidad, S. A.”
37 In 2002,  the different administrations involved in the project  (the Ministry of  Public
Works,  the Regional  Government of  Aragon and Zaragoza City Council)  all  signed an
agreement covering the management, financing and execution of the work required to
transform  the  railway  and  the  contiguous  urban  landscape.  The  objectives  of  this
agreement could be summarised as follows: to manage the urban development of the land
that would not be destined for railway uses; to carry out the work required to provide the
new rail infrastructure; and to ensure that the latter covered existing needs. To ensure
that these objectives were met, the same partners, in collaboration with ADIF, created the
public company Zaragoza Alta Velocidad (ZAV).
38 The value of the projected investment increased over time and currently stands at over a
billion euros. The initial idea was to reinvest the profits that were to be obtained from the
sale of land and its associated urban development in order to finance the corresponding
railway  and  urban  development  operations  (Alonso  and  Bellet,  2009).  Managing  this
process did not, however, prove as simple as had initially been envisaged and, even before
the onset of the economic crisis, a series of problems emerged with respect to property
management. While all of the plots should have been registered within a period of two
years, the economic and financial crisis effectively paralysed many of these operations. In
fact, even today, most of these plots remain unsold and all of the development operations
that have been carried out to date have had to be funded by the partners who signed the
initial urban development agreement (Bellet and Alonso, 2016).
39 In addition to the problems associated with the management of railway land, the venture
also suffered the consequences of its excessive number of obligations and urban projects
and the  cost  of  financing  them;  this  far  exceeded that  of  the  urban transformation
required to prepare the city for the arrival of the HST. When the property crisis arrived,
it effectively put a block on urban development and put an end to the dream of achieving
a rapid urban transformation. Even today, the plots of land in the vicinity of the station
that had been left free for future development, which should have been sold off to finance
the project, remain fenced off and unsold. In fact, ZAV is currently offering land for sale
at prices that are 60% cheaper than those of 2002, in an attempt to offset part of the
enormous debt that this company contracted as a result of its initial operations. Indeed,
the company currently has more debts  than assets.  The ZAV debt  amounts to €  400
million, with payment to banks due in 2019, whereas the current value of the land is € 214
million, compared to around € 500 million before the crisis (ZAV, 2014).
40 The bursting of the property bubble effectively put an end to one of the most important
and ambitious urban transformation projects that Spanish cities have ever seen.
 
The role of “Valladolid Alta Velocidad 2003, S.A.”
41 The  Estudio  Informativo (a  preliminary  report  drawn  up  prior  to  the  project)
corresponding to the remodelling of Valladolid’s Arterial Railway Network and its urban
integration, which had been commissioned by the Ministry of Public Works, was drafted
in 2000. At that time the local administration also presented a report, entitled Iniciativa
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para el Desarrollo de Valladolid (Initiative for the Development of Valladolid), which laid out
the different options for covering the railway and carrying out urban development. This
report also examined the economic and financial viability of the operation, based on the
profits to be obtained from the reconversion of urban land released from railway use.
42 Building on this base, in November 2002, the local, regional and state administrations
signed  a  collaborative  agreement  to  launch  this  urban-railway  operation.  Then,  in
January 2003, they founded Valladolid Alta Velocidad 2003 S.A. (VAV), a company created
with public capital, but subject to private law. The task of VAV was to produce the reports
and projects required to manage the associated urban development and to carry out work
to install  infrastructure  on the  land which would no longer  be  required for  railway
purposes once the railway installations had been moved. Its main purpose was therefore
to coordinate the work of  all  the different entities involved in this vast city project,
relating both to the railway and to urban development (Santos, 2013). The value of the
projected investment increased over time and currently stands at over € 1,100 million. 
43 This limited company was initially established with a capital of € 600,000. Of this, the
Railway Infrastructure Administrator (ADIF) had a share of 37.5%, the railway operator
RENFE 25%, the Regional Government of Castilla y León 25% and Valladolid City Council
12.5%. The balance sheets corresponding to the first five years of the company’s existence
showed relatively little activity, although it has since contracted work to a value of over €
140 million. The company is therefore effectively being funded by a bank credit based on
expectations of future property gains which have obviously not been forthcoming during
the  recent  period  of  economic  crisis.  However,  some  market  surveys  has  recently
highlighted a loss in the value of the land: from € 1,065 million to 594 or 397 million
depending on the survey (Norte de Castilla, 2015). The debt of the company is currently
about € 400 million in 2015 and has asked to defer payment.
 
The economic crisis and the current state of these
projects
44 The economic and financial crisis, and particularly the real property crisis, has brought
the development  of  these  macro-scale  urban projects,  and especially  those  involving
property  developments,  to  a  grinding  halt.  Although  the  success  of  these  projects
essentially depends on making profits from associated property operations, which are
now almost impossible to achieve, the strategies pursued have not changed very much
and the development model is still mainly based on making money from property deals
associated with the sale of this land.
45 Today, some fourteen years after the arrival of the HSR in Zaragoza, much of the project
for remodelling the city centre associated with the reorganisation of the railway remains
inactive and with little possibility of it being undertaken in the short to medium term.
Apart  from  such  basic  work  as  providing  railway  services,  constructing  the  new
intermodal  station,  and  improving  accessibility  in  order  to  help  develop  the  area
immediately surrounding the station, little more has been done to deliver the projects
that were initially envisaged.
46 The large urban voids that characterise the urban landscape between the new Delicias
station and the land occupied by the former El Portillo central station are particularly
desolate. In this part of the city, metallic fences are the predominant feature of the urban
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landscape. The project has yet to be completed and will probably need to be extensively
revised, taking into consideration the present economic context and the current financial
situation of ZAV.
47 In Valladolid, the rail infrastructure and equipment required to move the freight and
maintenance services  are currently under construction.  This  will  make it  possible  to
release  several  hectares  of  centrally  located  land  and  to  generate  income  through
property sales. The Eastern Variant and the New Railway Complex are also currently at
the work stage, and the transfer of RENFE’s General Workshops is expected to take place
in 2015.
48 VAV has obligations and investment perspectives that are hundreds of times greater than
its initial social capital. It continues to work with the support of bank loans, but has an
urgent  need  to  raise  capital,  as  its  financial  situation  is  becoming  increasingly
unsustainable. This explains why studies are currently underway to reduce the scale and
cost  of  the initial  operation and to find the best  way to obtain income from related
property operations.
 
Conclusions
49 In many cities, the arrival of the HST generated great expectations for urban renewal and
urban development based on the property boom, favourable economic prospects and a
host of neoliberal urban planning projects (Bellet, Alonso and Gutiérrez, 2012). However,
the present economic crisis has called into question the viability of this type of project
since most of the operations planned still remain unfinished. Even so, despite the very
difficult economic context, it must be stressed that these railway and urban development
projects have not been abandoned; they simply remain paralysed, waiting for a change in
the property market. 
50 In this work, we have examined two examples of this phenomenon: the arrival of the HST
in Zaragoza and Valladolid. In both cases, the HST was seen (both directly and indirectly)
as a strategic instrument that would bring about urban change and transformation.
51 These projects were conceived during a period of economic boom, when there were great
expectations of obtaining considerable profits from property-based operations associated
with the sale and reuse of former railway land. The initial plan was then to use this
revenue to finance the projected rail and urban transformations. To co-finance and make
these  rail  and  urban  development  projects  effective,  local  and  regional  authorities
established  public  limited  companies  under  publically  controlled  partnerships,  in
collaboration with ADIF (the Spanish Rail  Administrator) and RENFE (the Spanish rail
operator).
52 These unrealistic macro-projects call for economic and financial resources that far exceed
those  available  to  most  administrations.  They  first  appeared  within  a  period
characterised by a clearly neoliberal approach to urban development, but the current
economic reality has since put them into perspective. It is now obvious that the property
market expectations on which the actions of limited companies under public control such
as Zaragoza Alta Velocidad (ZAV) and Valladolid Alta Velocidad (VAV) were originally based
were unrealistic within a context of economic crisis. Faced with the problem of not being
able  to  undo what  has  already been done and a current  lack of  public  funding,  the
companies  and  entities  involved  in  these  ventures  now  find  themselves  having  to
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continue to follow strategies that had been adopted prior to the crisis.  Continuing to
work in this way, only an upturn in the property cycle or a major financial commitment
on the part of public administrations is likely to save these projects. 
53 In both of the study cases, the debts incurred must be renegotiated with banks. There are
also other Spanish cases in which no action has yet been initiated. These cases largely
explain  why  everything  has  been  paralyzed  and  some  companies  have  even  been
liquidated. In the cases of Zaragoza and Valladolid, however, the only real option -at least
officially- is to limit the ambitions of the initial projects in order to try to reduce costs,
and also to seek refinancing based on public guarantees while waiting for a change in the
economic cycle.
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ABSTRACTS
In Spain, several local councils have taken advantage of the arrival of high-speed rail to rethink
the whole railway system within the city. These rail transformations have caused major urban
changes and have also been accompanied by property development projects that were planned
during the economic expansion of the 1990s and first decade of 2000s, prior to the arrival of the
economic  crisis  in  2008.  The combination of  these  factors  has  resulted in  some of  the  most
important urban renewal and redevelopment projects ever planned in Spain. This has been the
case in two large intermediate cities:  Valladolid (303,905 inhabitants in 2015),  located on the
northwest HSR line, which received new services in 2007, and Zaragoza (664,953 inhabitants in
2015),  located on the Madrid-Barcelona-French border HSR line,  where the new train service
arrived in 2003.  In Spain,  the introduction of HSR services has been accompanied by certain
specific  issues  relating  to  their  initial  conception,  subsequent  management  and  associated
governance; these are illustrated in the article through case studies of Valladolid and Zaragoza. 
En Espagne, plusieurs conseils municipaux ont profité de l’arrivée du train à grande vitesse pour
repenser l’ensemble du système ferroviaire dans la ville. Ces transformations ont provoqué des
changements  urbains  importants  et  ont  également  été  accompagnées  de  projets  de
développement immobiliers, prévus lors de l’expansion économique des années 90 et pendant la
première  décennie  de  l’an  2000,  jusqu’à  l’arrivée  de  la  crise  en  2008.  La  coïncidence  de  ces
différents  facteurs  a  conduit  à  une  série  de  projets  urbains  de  réaménagement  et  de
redéveloppement parmi les plus importants jamais conçus en Espagne. Cela a été le cas dans deux
grandes villes espagnoles: Valladolid (303 905 habitants en 2015), sur la ligne nord-ouest à grande
vitesse, qui a bénéficié d’une nouvelle desserte en 2007 et de Saragosse (664 953 en 2015) sur la
ligne à grande vitesse Madrid-Barcelone-frontière française, où le train est arrivé en 2003. En
Espagne, l’introduction des dessertes TGV s’est accompagnée de modalités spécifiques quant à
leur conception initiale, puis en termes de gestion et de gouvernance; ceux-ci sont illustrés dans
l’article à travers l’étude des cas de Valladolid et Saragosse
INDEX
Mots-clés: réaménagement urbain, train à grande vitesse, structure urbaine, le chemin de fer et
la ville, Espagne, Valladolid, Saragosse
Keywords: urban redevelopment, high-speed rail, urban structure, rail and the city, Spain,
Zaragoza
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